This paper assesses the empirical relevance of nancial frictions in the Euro Area (EA) and the United States (US). It provides a comprehensive set of comparisons between two models: (i) a Smets and Wouters (2007) (SW) model with nancial frictions originating in non-nancial rms à la Bernanke et al. (1999) (SWBGG); and (ii) a SW model with frictions originating in nancial intermediaries, à la Gertler and Karadi (2011) (SWGK). Proved that the introduction of nancial frictions in either way improves the models' t compared to a standard SW model, the empirical comparisons reveal that the SWGK model outperforms the SWBGG model both in the EA and the US. Two main factors explain this result: rst, the magnitude of the nancial accelerator eect; and second, the role of the investment-specic technology shock in aecting nancial variables.
Introduction
In the aftermath of the nancial crisis the structure of the nancial system has received an increasing attention in the literature (see Brunnermeier et al., 2012 , for a survey). The features of external nancing are particularly relevant because of its impact on business cycle uctuations. Since the onset of the crisis developments in credit markets have changed substantially: total nancing to non-nancial corporations have declined both in the Euro Area (EA) and in the United States (US).
At their peak following the collapse of the Lehman Brothers, the credit spreads skyrocketed.
The dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) literature oers alternative micro-foundation of nancial market frictions. The inuential model of Bernanke et al. (1999) (BGG) is considered as a workhorse for the analysis of credit market imperfections in DSGE modelling. The BGG model features constrained rms that are the source of frictions in the form of a costly state verication problem (Townsend, 1979) . Much of the macroeconomic literature stemming from BGG emphasizes credit market constraints on non-nancial borrowers and treats nancial intermediaries largely as a veil. Gertler and Karadi (2011) (GK) , instead, explicitly model the banking sector as a source of nancial frictions due to the presence of a moral hazard problem. Another approach is oered by the seminal paper of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) , who focus on adverse selection as a source of nancial frictions (see also Christiano and Ikeda, 2011) .
Given such a variety of approaches, this paper investigates which type of nancial frictions is favored by the data. It empirically compares for the period 1983Q1-2008Q3 using EA and US data:
(i) the Smets and Wouters (2007) (SW) model; (ii) the SWBGG model, which incorporates nancial frictions à la Bernanke et al. (1999) where lenders pay a xed monitoring cost to observe the borrowers' realized return in a SW economy; and (iii) the SWGK model, where the nancial intermediary (FI, henceforth) faces endogenously determined balance sheet constraints. In the literature there are other papers presenting a SW economy with the nancial accelerator à la BGG; examples are Queijo von Heideken (2009), Gelain (2010) , Carrillo and Poilly (2013), Del Negro and , and Christiano et al. (2014) . The choice of these two modelling strategies BGG and GK for micro-founding nancial frictions can be explained by: (i) the established importance of the BGG approach in the mainstream DSGE literature on nancial frictions; (ii) the important role assigned to nancial intermediaries in the GK model; and (iii) their relative analytical tractability. These two models also share a common feature, i.e. nancial frictions originate in the group of agents that borrow and borrowing capacity is linked to net worth. An empirical comparison between the two approaches is novel in the DSGE arena.
As a rst step, this paper nds that the introduction of nancial frictions either à la BGG or GK improves the models' t, suggesting that these frictions are empirically relevant both in the EA and the US and this is in line with what Queijo von Heideken (2009) nds by comparing the SW and BGG models. The paper then focuses on the comparison between the SWBGG and SWGK models by examining: business cycle moments, models-implied spread, impulse responses, variance decomposition, and forecasting performance. The novel result is that the SWGK model outperforms the SWBGG model because of two main reasons. First, impulse response function analysis reveals that the magnitude of the nancial accelerator eect is dierent across the two models. The presence of the banking sector acts as a powerful amplication channel. The nancial accelerator eect embedded in the SWGK model is indeed stronger than that in the SWBGG model for those shocks which are the main drivers of business cycle uctuations. Disruptions in nancial markets are generally associated with a rise in the credit spread and a contraction in the quantity of credit. However, while a rise in the spread causes a decline in net worth of rms in the SWBGG model, nancial intermediaries benet from a rise in the spread because of the positive eects on the relevant net worth in the SWGK model. This mechanism generally leads to a stronger rise in the spread in the SWGK model with more severe eects on investment and, hence, on output compared to the SWBGG model. Therefore, the SWGK model provides a better solution to the so-called small shocks, large cycles puzzle (Bernanke et al., 1996) . The second reason is that the investment-specic technology shock plays a dierent role in the two models, both in the EA and the US: it explains a larger fraction of the spread in the SWBGG model compared to that in the SWGK model. However, this shock does not replicate the comovement between output and investment and the countercyclical behavior of the spread. Hence, its larger role in the SWBGG model provides another reasons for the better empirical performance of the SWGK model. Point forecast evaluation reveals that the SWGK model is favored also along this dimension in the EA, while in the US there is no clear evidence of an outperformed model in terms of forecasting accuracy.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briey presents the models. Section 3 describes the data and discusses the estimation strategy. Section 4 compares the estimated models, discusses the propagation mechanisms and presents models' forecasting performance. Finally, Section 5 concludes. An online appendix complements the paper by providing (a) the full details of the models; (b) an analysis aiming at disentangling the eects of the magnitude of the nancial frictions on impulse response functions; (c) a series of robustness checks for the empirical results.
The Models
This section briey sketches the three DSGE models. Compared to the standard SW economy, the dierent features are: (i) a utility function comparable with Smets and Wouters (2003) and Gertler and Karadi (2011) ; (ii) the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator for nal output and composite labor, as in Galí et al. (2011) ; (iii) the price mark-up, wage mark-up and government shocks are modelled as in Smets and Wouters (2003) ; and (iv) the presence of nancial frictions in the SWBGG and SWGK models, which changes the production side of the economy. In order to simplify the optimization problems of intermediate goods rms, retailers are the source of price stickiness.
In all models the economy is populated by: households; labor unions; labor packers; retailers; nal good rms; intermediate goods rms; and the policymaker. In the SWBGG and SWGK models the economy is also populated by capital producers, while the SWGK model incorporates FI.
Households consume, save, and supply labor. A labor union dierentiates labor and sets wages in a monopolistically competitive market. Competitive labor packers buy labor service from the union, package and sell it to intermediate goods rms. The good market has a similar structure: retailers buy goods from intermediate goods rms, dierentiate them and sell them in a monopolistically competitive market. The aggregate nal good is produced by perfectly competitive rms assembling a continuum of intermediate goods. The policymaker sets the nominal interest rate following a Taylor rule.
In the SWBGG model, intermediate goods rms maximize the ow of discounted prots by choosing the quantity of factors for production and stipulate a nancial contract to obtain funds from lenders. At the end of period t, rms buy capital K t+1 that will be used throughout time t + 1 at the real price Q t . The cost of purchased capital is then Q t K t+1 . A fraction of capital acquisition is nanced by their net worth, N t+1 , and the remainder by borrowing. In order to ensure that entrepreneurial net worth will never be enough to fully nance capital acquisitions, it is assumed that each rm survives until the next period with probability θ and her expected lifetime is consequently equal to 1/(1 − θ). At the same time, the new rms entering receive a transfer, N e t , from rms who die and depart from the scene. 1 There is a problem of asymmetric information about the project' s ex-post return because the return to capital is sensitive to an idiosyncratic shock. While the rm can costlessy observe the realization of the shock, the lender has to pay a xed auditing cost to observe borrower's return. If the rm pays in full there is no need to verify the project's return; but in the case of default the lender veries the state and pays the cost. As a consequence, the nancial contract implies an external nance premium, EP (·), i.e. a dierence between the cost of external and internal funds, that depends on the inverse of the rm's leverage ratio. FI are just a veil in the model (Gilchrist and Zakraj²ek, 2011) . Capital producers purchase investment and depreciated capital to transform them into capital sold to intermediate goods rms and used for production.
In the SWGK model, within each household there are two types of members at any point in time: the fraction g of the household members are workers and the fraction (1 − g) are bankers.
The FI have a nite horizon in order to avoid the possibility of full self-nancing. Every banker stays banker next period with a probability θ, which is independent of history. Therefore, every period (1 − θ) bankers exit and become workers. Similarly, a number of workers become bankers, keeping the relative proportion of each type of agents constant. The household provides her new banker with a start-up transfer, which is a small fraction, χ, of total assets. Each banker manages a nancial intermediary. The production sector is also made of intermediate goods rms and capital producers. The optimization problem of capital producers is the same as in the SWBGG model. The intermediate goods rms nance their capital acquisitions each period by obtaining funds from the FI. While there are no nancial frictions in this activity, there is a problem of moral hazard between FI and households, because the former can choose to divert a fraction λ of available funds from the project. Hence an incentive compatibility constraint should hold in order to make households willing to deposit money in the FI; as a result, the assets the FI can acquire depend positively on their net worth.
1 Following Christensen and Dib (2008) , consumption of exiting rms a small fraction of total consumption is ignored in the general equilibrium.
The detailed linearized models are shown in Table 1.   2   3 Data and estimation strategy In each model there are seven orthogonal structural shocks: the technology, ε a t ; the investmentspecic technology, ε x t ; the monetary policy, ε r t ; the capital quality, ε k t ; 3 the government, ε g t ; the price mark-up, ε p t ; and the wage mark-up, ε w t , shocks. In each model, the shocks follow an AR (1) process.
The models are estimated with quarterly data for the period 1983Q1-2008Q3, using as observables real GDP, real investment, real private consumption, hours worked, GDP deator ination, real wage and the nominal interest rate. The starting date is the same used by Smets and Wouters (2005) , while the nal quarter corresponds to the pre-crisis period since the purpose of this paper is to make a comparison among the models in normal times. Moreover, ending in 2008Q3 allows to avoid potential distortionary eects on the estimates of the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate (Galí et al., 2011 The following set of measurement equations show the link between the observables in the dataset and the endogenous variables of the DSGE model:
where γ is the common quarterly trend growth rate of GDP, consumption, investment and wages; π is the steady-state quarterly ination rate; andr n is the steady-state quarterly nominal interest rate. A hat over a variable indicates the log-deviation from steady state.
2 More details are available in the online appendix. 3 The Smets and Wouters (2007) model features a risk premium shock, which is meant to proxy frictions in the process of nancial intermediation (not explicitly modelled). Since the SWBGG and SWGK models provide an explicit microfoundation for nancial frictions, the risk premium shock has been replaced with the nancial shock proposed by Gertler and Karadi. Exercises for the Euro Area (Villa, 2013) with a dierent ltering technique show that the main result of the paper still holds in the presence of the risk premium shock instead of the capital quality shock.
Calibration and priors
The parameters which cannot be identied in the dataset and/or are related to steady state values of the variables are calibrated. The time period in the model corresponds to one quarter in the data. Table 2 shows the calibration of the parameters common to both models. The discount factor, β, is equal to 0.99, implying a quarterly steady state real interest rate of 1%; the capital income share, α, is equal to 0.33. The depreciation rate is equal to 0.025, corresponding to an annual depreciation rate of 10%. The ratio of government spending to GDP is equal to 0.20. The elasticities of substitution in goods and labor markets are equal to 6 in order to target a gross steady state mark up of 1.20, as in Christiano et al. (2014) , among many others.
The calibration of the nancial parameters is shown in Table 3 . The parameter θ represents the survival rate of intermediate goods rms in the SWBGG model and of FI in the SWGK model. This parameter is set equal to 0.972 implying an expected working life for bankers and rms of almost a decade; this value is close to those in BGG and GK. In the SWBGG model the parameter pinning down the steady state spread, S, is set to match the steady state spread of 150 basis points.
Following BGG, the ratio of capital to net worth is set to 2, implying that 50% of rm's capital expenditures are externally nanced. As long as the calibration of the SWGK model is concerned, the fraction of assets given to new bankers, χ, and the fraction of assets that can be diverted, λ, are equal to 0.001 and 0.515, respectively, to target the same steady state spread of 150 basis points and a steady state leverage ratio of 4. 4 The online appendix investigates the robustness of the main results to the calibration of the nancial parameters. Table 4 shows the assumptions for the prior distributions of the estimated parameters for both models; the prior distributions are the same for both countries. The choice of the functional forms of parameters and the location of the prior mean correspond to a large extent to those in Wouters (2003, 2007) where applicable. The prior of some model-specic parameters are as follows. The parameter measuring the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply follows a Normal distribution with a prior mean of 0.33, the value used by Gertler and Karadi (2011) , and a loose standard deviation of 0.25. The elasticity of external nance premium with respect to leverage of rms is assumed to follow a Beta distribution with prior mean of 0.05 and standard deviation of 0.05, which implies [0.002, 0.151] 90% prior interval.
Models comparison
This section performs empirical comparisons among the models estimated both for the Euro Area and United States, with a focus on the SWBGG and SWGK models since this is the novel part of the paper. The comparison is made along the following dimensions: (i) the estimated parameters and the likelihood race; (ii) simulated business cycle moments versus those in the data and modelsimplied spread; (iii) impulse response functions and variance decomposition; and (iv) the forecasting 4 Compared to Gertler and Karadi (2011) , the higher value of the steady state spread is targeted with a higher calibration of the parameter λ.
performance. The online appendix presents some robustness exercises.
Estimated parameters and likelihood race
The mean of the estimated parameters for each model is computed with two chains of the Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm with a sample of 250,000 draws.
5 Table 4 reports the posterior mean with 95%
probability intervals in parentheses of the SWBGG and SWGK models for the Euro Area and the United States. Most parameters are remarkably similar across the two models. As in Smets and Wouters (2005) , the fact that in almost all the cases the posterior estimate of a parameter in one model falls in the estimated condence band for the same parameter of the other model can be considered as a rough measure of similarity.
As far as the Euro Area is concerned, the degree of price stickiness reveals that rms adjust prices about every year and half, with a higher degree of stickiness in SWGK model. The Calvo parameter for wage stickiness reveals that the average duration of wage contracts is slightly more than a year, lower than the degree of price stickiness, as in Smets and Wouters (2003) . There is a moderate degree of price indexation and a higher degree of wage indexation similarly to previous estimates for the EA (Adolfson et al., 2008; Gerali et al., 2010) . The mean of the parameter measuring the elasticity of capital utilization is higher than its prior mean, revealing that capital utilization is more costly than assumed a-priori. The estimated value in both models favors high costs of capital utilization, suggesting a minor role for this internal propagation mechanism, in line with the literature (e.g. Adolfson et al., 2007; Christoel et al., 2008) .
6 The estimates of the parameter measuring the Taylor rule reaction to ination are also in line with previous estimates for the EA, with a higher value in the SWBGG model. There is also evidence of short-term reaction to the current change in the output gap. Turning to the exogenous shock processes, all shocks are quite persistent but the wage mark-up shock. The mean of the standard errors of the shocks is in line with the similar studies of the EA, but the standard deviation of the investment-specic technology shock which is higher.
As far as the US economy is concerned, the two models with nancial frictions feature a higher degree of price stickiness compared to the value found by Smets and Wouters (2007) , since average length of price contract is more than two years. Our results are in line with Del .
Similarly to the EA, the estimates of the parameter measuring the elasticity of capital utilization are higher than the prior mean, rather in line with the value found by Smets and Wouters for the shock has a lower persistence and volatility compared to the SWGK model.
5 Version 4.3.3 of the Dynare toolbox for Matlab is used for the computations. For details on the Bayesian estimation procedure see Fernández-Villaverde (2010) , among others. 6 In a calibrated real business cycle model Villa (2012) shows that capital utilization play a limited role in amplifying the eects of the shocks hitting the economy. It should also be noted that parameter ζ is a transformation of parameter ψ, estimated by Smets and Wouters (2003) . In particular, ζ = 1/(1 + ψ). Following Smets and Wouters (2007) , the parameter ζ ∈ [0, 1] is estimated.
The estimated mean of the elasticity of the external nance premium with respect to the leverage position is equal to 0.04 in the Euro Area and to 0.05 in the United States. Also in this case the posterior estimate of this parameter for one country falls in the estimated condence band for the same parameter of the other country.
7 An estimated elasticity dierent from zero is a rst piece of evidence in favor of a model with nancial frictions.
The Bayes factor (BF) is used to judge the relative t of the models, as in An and Schorfheide (2007) , among many others.
8 According to Jereys (1998) , a BF of 3 − 10 provides slight evidence in favor of model i; a BF in the range [10 − 100] provides strong to very strong evidence in favor of model i; and a BF greater than 100 provides decisive evidence.
The main results are shown in Table 5 . As a rst step, the comparison is made with the SW model featuring perfect nancial markets. The introduction of nancial frictions à la BGG leads to an improvement of the marginal likelihood for both EA and US data, suggesting that these Table 5 . This result is true also for the United States: the comparison between the two models with nancial frictions provides decisive evidence in favor of the SWGK model.
4.2
Business cycle moments and models-implied spread
In order to investigate which features of the data are better captured by the SWGK model, this subsection rst shows the comparison between the moments generated by the models and those in the data, as in Iacoviello and Neri (2010) . It then investigates whether the estimated models generates proxies of the spread with business cycle uctuations in line with the data. Kamber et al. (2012) and Fernández and Gulan (2014) , from the value of the elasticity it is possible to trace out the values of the deep parameters of the nancial contract, which are also consistent with the calibrated parameters shown in Tables 2 and 3. As far as the Euro Area is concerned, these values are: a share of monitoring costs equal to 0.22; a standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock to rm's return equal to 0.25; the resulting quarterly business failure rate is 0.02/4. For the United States they are: a share of monitoring costs equal to 0.17; a standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock to rm's return equal to 0.32; the resulting quarterly business failure rate is 0.025/4.
8 Such a comparison is based on the marginal likelihood of alternative models. Let mi be a given model, with mi ∈ M , θ the parameter vector and pi(θ|mi) the prior density for model mi. The marginal likelihood for a given model mi and common dataset Y is
where L(Y |θ, mi) is the likelihood function for the observed data Y conditional on the parameter vector and on the model; and L(Y |mi) is the marginal data density. The Bayes factor is the ratio between the marginal likelihoods. The log data density of the three models is computed with the Geweke (1999)'s modied harmonic mean estimator.
As far as the Euro Area is concerned, the comparison of the relative standard deviations of investment and consumption (with respect to output) shows that for both the SWBGG and SWGK models the condence bands contain the empirical standard deviations. The SWGK model ts all the variables better compared to the SWBGG model in terms of the value of the posterior mean.
However, both models performs poorly in replicating the relative standard deviations of interest rate and ination since the models' business cycle statistics are outside the empirical standard deviations.
10
The comparison of the cross-correlation with output reveals that the SWBGG and the SWGK models cannot reproduce the cross-correlation of investment and the SWBGG performs worse. The SWGK model ts the data better than the SWBGG model in terms of cross-correlations of consumption, ination and interest rate, although results are rather similar since business cycle statistics of the data are within condence bands of both models. Table 6 nally reports the autocorrelation coecients of order 1. Variables are more autocorrelated in the two models than in the data, as in Gabriel et al. (2011) . When it comes to matching ination, the models are from replicating its dynamics in the data. Overall, the presence nancial frictions originating in nancial intermediaries is preferable in the data compared to a model where nancial frictions originate in non-nancial rms, in particular as far as investment dynamics is concerned.
The comparison of simulated business cycle moments between the two models in the United
States is similar to that in the EA. Also for the United States the two models perform poorly in replicating the relative standard deviations of ination and interest rate, while the SWGK model gets closer to the data in replicating the cross-correlation of investment. 9 Theoretical moments are computed from the state-space representation for 1, 000 random draws from the posterior distributions which produce 1, 000 sets of theoretical moments. Data are linearly detrended.
10 Since the models fail in replicating the relative standard deviations of interest rate and to a minor extent of ination, there could be some doubt on the overall ability of the models to t the data. As a robustness check, the models are then estimated allowing for measurement errors in ination and wages, as well as for a moving-average component in the price and wage mark up shocks. In such a case there is indeed an improvement in the ability of the models in replicating the relative standard deviation of ination and, to a minor extent, the nominal interest rate. The log data density reveals that the ranking of the re-estimated models is not aected and the SWGK model is still the preferred one. Details are available in the online Appendix C. An alternative way to improve the relative standard deviations of ination and interest rate could be to include innovations to trend ination in the NK Phillips curve as suggested by Cogley and Sbordone (2008) . The two models embed a dierent transmission mechanism: while in the SWBGG model the nancial accelerator eect works through the rms' balance sheet channel, in the SWGK model it works through the bank lending channel. And the dynamics of net worth is dierently aected by a change in the spread in the two models. Generally speaking, the equations describing the accumulation of net worth of rms and banks 16a and 20b, respectively, in Table 1 are similar.
Both equations contain a term for net worth of the previous period, the leverage, the rate of return on capital and the risk free rate. However, the eect of any exogenous shock on net worth of rms is dramatically dierent from the eects of the same shock on net worth of FI. As explained by Villa and Yang (2011) , three factors aect the prots of FI: the lending volume, the spread and the leverage. Any contractionary shock aects bank's prots either directly or indirectly. The FI decides about the amount of corporate bonds it holds subject to the incentive constraint, the expected capital return, and the deposit return. A fall in the asset price leads to a deterioration of FI balance sheets. The reduction in net worth makes the incentive constraint tighter, leading to a higher spread and, hence, prots. The resulting rise of the spread has also the eect of reducing the demand for loans by rms, leading to a further contraction in investment and, hence, output. This is the essence of the nancial accelerator eect of the SWGK model. The increase in the spread after a negative shock helps nancial intermediaries to rebuild faster their net worth. On the contrary, in the SWBGG model the rise in the spread causes a further fall in net worth. Hence optimizing nancial intermediaries benet from a rise in the spread. In most shocks the rise in the spread is indeed stronger in the SWGK model. But this causes a more pronounced fall in investment and, hence, output. The SWGK model provides a better solution to the so-called small shocks, large cycles puzzle (Bernanke et al., 1996) .
For all the shocks estimated for the Euro Area, but the investment-specic technology and the price mark up shocks, the nancial accelerator eect embedded in the SWGK model is indeed amplied compared to that in the SWBGG model as shown by Figures 3 and 4 . The propagation mechanism of the capital quality shock which is the main driver of GDP at all horizons, as shown in Table 7 is as follows. In the SWBGG model the capital quality shock aects only the demand side of the credit market through two main mechanisms: (1) due to the simulated recession, there is a fall in asset prices and the return on capital, causing a downward shift in the demand for capital;
(2) the fall in net worth due to the reduction in the return on capital, of capital and the price of capital, causes an increase in leverage. This leads to a rise in the spread, and hence a further fall in investment. The fall in net worth is persistent, since this variable is well below steady state after 20 quarters. In the SWGK a capital quality shock directly translates into a shock to bank's balance sheet due to the identity between capital and assets. Due to the presence of moral hazard, depositors require banks not to be overleveraged. Hence they are forced to reduce lending. The reduction in the lending volume makes the incentive constraint tighter, leading to a higher spread and, hence, to a higher protability. Compared to the SWBGG model the increase of the spread from its steady state is much larger. On one hand, net worth tends to rise back to its steady state.
On the other, non-nancial rms observe a rise in borrowing costs and consequently reduce their demand of capital. The fall in investment is indeed much more pronounced in the SWGK model.
A contractionary monetary policy shock is shown in the third and fourth row of Figure 3 . While the sign of the impact responses are similar among the models, the transmission mechanism is different. In both models an increase in the nominal interest rate reduces investment and, therefore, output. Demand downward pressures feed through changes in the output gap to ination. This causes a downward shift in aggregate demand, which reduces ination on impact. This standard transmission mechanism of the monetary policy shock is enhanced through its impact on credit markets. In the SWBGG model the decline in the price of capital due to the tightening of monetary policy causes a fall in net worth of intermediate goods rms. This implies that the potential divergence of interests between rms and lenders is greater and, therefore, agency costs increase. As a result, the rise in the spread further reinforces the simulated contraction in capital and investment.
In the SWGK model, due to the retrenchment in investment, loans decrease as well. At the same time the fall in asset prices worsen FI's balance sheet. The deterioration in intermediary balance sheets pushes up the spread. The increase in nancing costs causes a further decline in loans and investment.
The contractionary government spending shock leads to a positive wealth eect, leading to a crowding-out eect on consumption and investment. As evident from Table 7 this shock plays a marginal role in aecting all the variables at any horizon.
A more detailed explanation is needed for the investment-specic technology shock, depicted in the last two rows of Figure 3 . This shock causes a rise in the price of capital, Q t , which has two opposite eects in the SWBGG model as also explained by Kamber et al. (2012) : (i) investment falls as well as output; and (ii) net worth of rms increases due to the higher return on capital, equation (16a) in Table 1 . The latter eect causes a fall in the spread. This in turn determines an increase in investment. This latter eect dominates in the estimated model and investment rises. Hence this shock does not replicate the positive comovement between output and investment, at least on impact.
Moreover, it accounts for most of the forecast error variance of investment at longer horizons, as evident from Table 7 . This result can explain why both the SWBGG and SWGK models fail to replicate the cross-correlation of investment with output reported in Table 6 . In addition, contrary to empirical evidence (e.g. Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero, 2011; Agénor et al., 2014) , this shock causes a procyclical response of the spread. This result is particularly interesting when combined with the variance decomposition analysis. The investment-specic technology shock explains 73% of the unconditional variance decomposition of the spread in the SWBGG model, and more than 80% of the variance decomposition of the spread at longer horizons. Hence, it could be argued that in this model investment and the spread, important variables in explaining the nancial accelerator mechanism, are explained by a counterintuitive shock. In the SWGK model, an investment-specic technology shock exerts three main eects: (i) the price of capital rises, causing a fall in investment and output; (ii) the retrenchment in investment leads to a lower demand for lending, aecting in turn bank's prots; and (iii) net worth of FI rises because of the higher return on capital, equation Table 1 . The rst two eects acts in the direction of reducing investment, while the latter eect which turns out to be quantitatively more important leads to a rise in investment.
Overall, the contractionary eect in output prevails. Similarly to the SWBGG model, the spread falls. Table 7 shows that investment-specic technology shock explains 17% of the unconditional variance decomposition of the spread and even lower fractions at dierent horizons. And this shock, although it is the main driver of investment uctuations in particular at longer horizons, explains a lower fraction of its uctuations compared to the SWBGG model. This dierence is evident at all the horizons. The minor importance of the investment-specic technology shock in particular on investment and on the spread provides some explanation on the better t of the SWGK model reported in the previous section.
The technology shock, shown in Figure 4 , has a direct impact on output by making factors less productive, and leads to an increase in prices due to the contraction in aggregate supply. Investment and consumption decline due to the contraction in output. In the SWBGG model the lower return on capital and the decrease in the price of capital aects net worth of rms, which decreases. There is a moderate rise of the spread, which contributes to the fall in investment. In the SWGK model the decrease in asset prices also worsens the FI's balance sheet. Such a deterioration leads to an increase in the spread, and hence in prots. This makes it possible to net worth to come back to steady state faster compared to the SWBGG model. The higher borrowing costs discourages the demand for it, leading to a further and a more pronounced retrenchment in investment.
A positive price mark-up shock exerts a contractionary eect on real activity leading to a decline in output, investment and consumption. The ination rate increases and, since the Taylor rule is operating, this leads to a rise in the nominal interest rate. This shock tends to reduce both the return on and the price of capital. Hence, net worth of rms in the SWBGG model and of FI in the SWGK model falls. The role of the price mark-up shock in explaining variations in real and nancial variables is very limited for both models, as shown by Table 7 . Similar argument applies to the wage mark-up shock: it leads to an increase in the prices of factors for production, causing a fall in their equilibrium quantity. This exerts a contractionary eect on output, as shown by the last two rows of Figure 4 . The rise in prices is accompanied by a rise in the nominal interest rate.
Dierently from the price mark-up shock the wage rises. This causes an increase in the marginal product of capital, Z k , as also evident from equation (8) in Table 1 . This, in turn, leads to a temporary rise in the return on capital and, hence, in net worth both in the SWBGG and SWGK models. In the former, the rise in net worth and the fall in leverage explains the pro-cyclical response of the spread, which falls as in Gelain (2010) . In the SWGK model, instead, the spread exhibits a counter-cyclical behavior. Similarly to the price mark-up, the wage mark-up shock plays a marginal role in accounting for uctuations in real and nancial variables. transmitted through the bank lending channel has a stronger impact on real activity in the EA than in the US where the corporate sector has access to markets in addition to nancial intermediaries (e.g. Ciccarelli et al., 2013) . The analysis of the variance decomposition points to results similar to the Euro Area: the investment-specic technology shock accounts for more than 60% of the forecast error variance of the spread in the SWBGG model, while it accounts for 16% of the variance of the spread in the SWGK model. The same shock is the main driver of investment in the SWBGG model both in terms of unconditional variance decomposition and at longer horizons. In the SWGK model, instead, the capital quality shock is the main driver of investment. As evident from impulse responses, the investment-specic technology shock features a pro-cyclical behavior of the spread and a counter-cyclical behavior of investment, contrary to the empirical evidence. Hence, its larger role in the SWBGG model could explain the better t of the SWGK model also for the US economy.
Overall, two main factors could provide some explanations on the better t of the SWGK model.
First, nancial intermediaries provide a more powerful endogenous mechanism of amplication due to the more pronounced eect on the spread after a contractionary shock. And second, the important role of investment-specic technology shock in explaining investment and the spread in the SWBGG model is likely to explain the lower t of the model itself. originating in intermediate goods rms due to a costly state verication problem à la Bernanke et al. (1999) ; and the SWGK model with nancial frictions embedded in nancial intermediaries due to a moral hazard problem à la Gertler and Karadi (2011) . The main result is that the SWGK model is always favored both by EA and US data. The reasons for the better empirical performance of the SWGK are mainly two: rst, impulse response function analysis reveals that the presence of the banking sector acts as a powerful amplication channel of the shocks hitting the economy. This is caused by the dierent eect that a change in the spread causes on the relevant net worth in the models. As a result, the nancial accelerator eect embedded in the SWGK model is stronger than that in the SWBGG model. Second, the investment-specic technology shock plays a dierent role in the two models, both in the EA and the US. In particular, it explains a larger fractions of the dynamics of the spread and investment in the SWBGG model compared to those in the SWGK model. However, this shock does not replicate the comovement between output and investment and the countercyclical behavior of the spread. Hence, its larger role in the SWBGG model provides another reasons for the better empirical performance of the SWGK model. This paper also nds that introducing frictions aecting the banking sector tends to improve the quality of point forecasts of GDP growth, investment growth and the nominal interest rate in the EA. In the United States, instead, no model clearly dominates the other in terms of forecasting accuracy and the root mean squared forecast errors are remarkably similar across the two models.
The results presented in this paper oer some avenues for future research. First, it would be interesting to analyze a model featuring both types of nancial frictions, at rms level and in the banking sector, in order to examine the transmission mechanism of the shocks and the accelerator/attenuator eects. And second, such a model could also incorporate the same form of nancial friction (costly state verication or moral hazard at both levels) in order to empirically verify which modelling device is preferred by the data. DSGE models with a comprehensive structure of nancial markets would improve our understanding of business cycle uctuations.
SW model
(1) Euler equation
SWBGG model: equations (1)(12) + (13a) Price of capitalR
(15b) Value of expanding net worthDt = θβZEt[Λt,t+1 +Ẑt,t+1 +Dt+1] (16b) Gross growth rate of net worthẐt,t+1 ε, elasticity of substitution in good market set to target M = 1.20 ε w , elasticity of substitution in labor market set to target M w = 1.20 (1600) trend, respectively); data are extracted from the ALFRED database of the St. Louis Fed. 
where h measures the degree of supercial external habits in consumption, L t is labor supply in terms of hours worked and φ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The representative household enters period t with real government bonds, that pay the gross real interest rate, R t , between t − 1 and t. During period t, each household chooses to consume C t ; supplies L t hours of work; and allocates savings in government bonds, B t+1 . Each household gains an hourly real wage, W h t /P t ; and dividend payments, Π t , from rms. The government grants transfers T R t and imposes real lump-sum taxes T t . In addition, each household owns the capital stock which she rents to intermediate goods rms at a real gross rental rate R H t . As explained by Smets and Wouters (2003) , the supply of rental services from capital can be risen either by investing, I t , or by changing the utilization rate of installed capital, U t . The law of motion of capital, K t , is equal to
where δ stands for depreciation and e k t is the capital quality shock, as in Gertler and Karadi (2011) , which is meant to capture exogenous variation in the value of capital due to economic obsolescence.
The adjustment cost function satises the following properties:
(1) = (1) = 0, and (1) = ξ > 0. The shock to the marginal eciency of investment, x t , follows an AR(1) process, ρ x is an autoregressive coecient and ε x t is a serially uncorrelated, normally distributed shock with zero mean and standard deviation σ x . This shock varies the eciency with which the nal good can be transformed into physical capital.
11 All households choose the same allocation in equilibrium; hence, for sake of notation, the j index is dropped.
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The budget constraint is as follows:
where Ψ(U t ) represents the costs of changing capital utilization, with ζ = Ψ (U t )/Ψ (U t ). Maximization of equation (3) subject to (4) and (5) yields the following rst-order conditions with respect
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, mu t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint and let Λ t,t+1 ≡ 
where ε w is the elasticity of substitution across dierent types of labor. Labor packers solve the problem of choosing the varieties of labor to minimize the cost of producing a given amount of the aggregate labor index, taking each nominal wage rate W t (l) as given:
The demand for labor is given by
where W t is the aggregate wage index. Equations (15) and (12) imply
Labor unions adjust wages infrequently following the Calvo scheme. Let σ w be the probability of keeping wages constant and (1 − σ w ) the probability of changing wages. In other words, each period there is a constant probability (1 − σ w ) that the union is able to adjust the wage, independently of past history. This implies that the fraction of unions setting wages at t is (1 − σ w ). For the other fraction that cannot adjust, the wage is automatically increased at the aggregate ination rate. The wage for non-optimizing unions evolves according to the following trajectory W * t (l), W * t (l)
.., where σ wi denotes the degree of wage indexation.
The union chooses W * t to maximize
subject to the labor demand (15), and the indexation scheme so that L t+s (l) =
L t+s . The rst order condition is equal to
where M w,t = εw εw−1 u w t is the time varying gross wage mark-up and u w t is the wage mark-up shock which follows an AR (1) process, ρ w is an autoregressive coecient and ε wm t is a serially uncorrelated, normally distributed shock with zero mean and standard deviation σ wm . The dynamics of the aggregate wage index is expressed as 
where ε is the elasticity of substitution across varieties of goods. Final goods rms solve the problem of choosing Y t (f ) to minimize the cost of production:
The demand function for intermediate good f is given by
where P t is the aggregate wage index. Equations (23) and (20) imply
Retailers simply purchase intermediate goods at a price equal to the marginal cost and dierentiate them in a monopolistically competitive market, similarly to labor unions in the labor market.
Retailers set nominal prices in a staggered fashion. Each retailer resets its price with probability
(1 − σ p ). For the fraction of retailers that cannot adjust, the price is automatically increased at the aggregate ination rate. The price for non-optimizing retailers evolves according to the following trajectory P * t (f ), P * t (f )
.., where σ pi denotes the degree of price indexation. The real price Φ t charged by intermediate goods rms in the competitive market represents also the real marginal cost common to all nal good rms, i.e. M C t = Φ t .
A retailer resetting its price in period t maximizes the following ow of discounted prots with
subject to the demand function (23), and the indexation scheme so that Y t+s (f ) =
Y t+s . Let M C n t denote the nominal marginal cost. The gross mark-up charged by nal good rm f can be dened as
In the symmetric equilibrium all nal good rms charge the same price, P t (f ) = P t , hence the relative price is unity. It follows that, in the symmetric equilibrium, the mark-up is simply the inverse of the marginal cost.
The rst order condition for this problem is
Similarly to the labor market, the gross time varying price mark up is M p,t = ε ε−1 u p t and u p t is the price mark-up shock, which follows an AR(1) process, ρ p is an autoregressive coecient and ε pm t is a serially uncorrelated, normally distributed shock with zero mean and standard deviation σ pm .
The equation describing the dynamics for the aggregate price level is given by
Intermediate goods rms produce goods in a perfectly competitive market. They maximize the ow of discounted prots by choosing the quantity of factors for production
where Φ t is the competitive real price at which intermediate good is sold and R H t is the real rental price of capital. The production function follows a Cobb-Douglas technology:
where Θ represents xed costs in production (Smets and Wouters, 2007) . A t is the transitory technology shock following an AR(1) process, ρ a is an autoregressive coecient and ε a t is a serially uncorrelated, normally distributed shock with zero mean and standard deviation σ a . Maximization yields the following rst order conditions with respect to capital and labor:
where M P K t is the marginal product of capital and M P L t is the marginal product of labor.
A.1.4 The policymaker and aggregation
The policymaker sets the nominal interest rate according to the following Taylor rule (SW, 2003) ln
and
where R n t is the nominal gross interest rate, Π is the steady state ination rate, Y p t is the level of output that would prevail under exible prices and wages without the two mark-up shocks, and ε r t is the monetary policy shock.
The resource constraint completes the model,
A.2 The SWBGG model
The presence of nancial frictions originating in the demand side of the credit market alters the set-up of intermediate goods rms compared to the SW economy. This section then presents the set-up of capital producers which determine the price of capital (this simplies the optimization problem of households).
A.2.1 Households
In the SWBGG model capital producers purchase investment and depreciated capital to transform them into capital sold to rms and intermediate goods rms choose the optimal utilization rate of capital. Hence the household simply chooses consumption, labor supply and the amount of assets, which represent real deposits in the FI as well as real government bonds. Both intermediary deposits and government debt are one period real bonds that pay the gross real interest rate, R t , between t and t + 1. Both instruments are riskless and are thus perfect substitutes. This optimization problem yields the rst-order conditions (6), (7) and (8) 
A.2.2 Capital producers
Capital producers purchase at time t investment and depreciated capital to transform them into capital sold to rms and used for production at time t + 1. Capital producers also face adjustment costs for investment as in Christiano et al. (2005) . The law of motion of capital is then equal to equation (4).
The prots are given by the dierence between the revenue from selling capital at the relative price Q t and the costs of buying capital from intermediate goods rms and the investment needed to build new capital. The optimality condition is a Tobin's Q equation, which relates the price of capital to the marginal adjustment costs,
A.2.3 Intermediate goods rms
Intermediate goods rms produce goods in a perfectly competitive market and they borrow in order to nance the acquisition of capital. They maximize the ow of discounted prots by choosing the quantity of factors for production. This problem is identical to that in the SW economy, described by equations (28) (30). In equilibrium the optimal capital demand is
where E t R k t+1 is the expected marginal external nancing cost.
In addition rms also decide the optimal capital utilization rate solving the following maximization
This optimization problem is summarized by the following equilibrium condition
Intermediate goods rms face also the problem of stipulating the nancial contract. BGG assume that an agency problem makes external nance more expensive than internal funds and solve a nancial contract that maximizes the payo to the rms subject to the lender earning the required rate of return.
12 Hence, in equilibrium, the marginal external nancing cost must equate the external nance premium gross of the riskless real interest rate:
with EP (·) < 0 and EP (1) = 1. As the borrower's equity stake in a project N t+1 /Q t K t+1 falls, i.e. the leverage ratio rises, the loan becomes riskier and the cost of borrowing rises. Linearisation of equation (38) yields:
where κ ≡ − Aggregate entrepreneurial net worth evolves according to the following law of motion
where the rst component of the right-hand-side represents the net worth of the θ fraction of surviving entrepreneurs net of borrowing costs carried over from the previous period, and N e t is the transfer that newly entering entrepreneurs receive.
Following BGG and Gabriel et al. (2011) , monitoring costs are ignored in the resource constraint since, under reasonable parameterizations, they have negligible impact on model's dynamics.
12 See BGG, Appendix, for the derivation of the nancial contract and for the aggregation. 13 A variable with a`hat' denotes a percentage deviation from steady state.
A.3
The SWGK model 
where R k t+1 represents the non-contingent real gross return on assets.
The problem of moral hazard consists in the fact that the banker can choose to divert the fraction λ of available funds from the project and transfer them back to her household. The depositors require to be willing to supply funds to the banker that the gains from diverting assets should be less or equal than the costs of doing so:
where Υ t is the expected terminal wealth, dened as
Equation (42) translates in the following constraint for the FI,
where lev t stands for the FI leverage ratio. The agency problem introduces an endogenous balance sheet constraint for the FI.
Total net worth is the sum of net worth of existing bankers, N e , and net worth of new bankers, N n , which are dened as: 
B Counterfactual exercises for impulse responses Two considerations are worth mentioning for all the shocks: (1) a change in the spread exerts a dierent eect on the dynamics of the relevant net worth in the SWBGG and the SWGK models; and (2) the structural parameters dier between the two models as evident from Table 4 . It is important to check whether these factors could account for the dierence in the transmission mechanism of the shocks between the models.
As far as the rst issue is concerned, a contractionary shock generally causes a rise in the spread, a fall in net worth and a decrease in investment. However, a rise in the spread aects the dynamics of the relevant net worth in a dierent way, as explained in the main text: in the SWGK model the prots of nancial intermediaries increase and this helps nancial intermediaries to rebuild quickly their net worth. In the SWBGG model, instead, a rise in the borrowing costs causes a protracted decline in net worth of non-nancial rms. This subsection shows a counterfactual exercise in order to mitigate the eects of the spread on the dynamics of net worth of nancial intermediaries in the SWGK model. In order to do so, the steady state leverage is calibrated at 2, while in the baseline calibration it is equal to 4. A reduction in the steady state leverage substantially aects the dynamics of net worth, as evident from equation (20b) in Table 1 Figure 7 shows EA impulse responses to the shocks which are quantitatively more important in terms of the variance decomposition analysis. The dynamics of net worth is substantially aected for all the three shocks. The impact response of net worth in the counterfactual SWGK model is closer to that of the SWBGG model. At the same time, the rise in the spread is more pronounced in the counterfactual SWGK model compared to the SWBGG model. This is explained by the fact that the tighter incentive constraint leads to a higher spread and, hence, to a higher protability for nancial intermediaries. In the case of the capital quality and TFP shocks, the stronger amplication eect on output and investment is still present in the counterfactual SWGK model, albeit to a minor extent.
In the case of the investment-specic technology shock, the moderate increase in net worth leads to a positive response of the spread in the counterfactual experiment, causing a less pronounced increase in investment and hence a more severe decline in output. With the exception of the investmentspecic technology shock, overall the magnitude of the nancial accelerator eect on output in the SWGK model (lev=4) is double compared to the eect obtained in a SWGK model with leverage However, in the case of the capital quality shock the impact response of the spread in the SWBGG model is higher than that of the counterfactual SWGK model. This can also be explained by the higher estimate of elasticity of the external nance premium with respect to the leverage position of rms in the US compared to that in the EA. And the amplication eect of the SWGK model is minor in the counterfactual model compared to the baseline specication.
The role of the dierent structural parameters is relevant only for the price mark-up shock in the models estimated for the Euro Area. The more severe fall in output in the SWBGG model compared to that in the SWGK model, shown in Figure 4 , is only explained by the higher estimated persistence of the price mark-up shock in the former model.
C Robustness analysis
This subsection illustrates whether the better t of the SWGK model is robust: (i) to a larger estimation sample; (ii) to the calibration of the steady state leverage ratio of the SWBGG and SWGK models; and (iii) to the models' specication. It nally presents the likelihood race when allowing for measurement errors for ination and wages. All these robustness exercises are based on 100,000 draws from the random walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
The rst row of the Table 10 shows that, even including data for the recent nancial crisis, the SWGK model still performs better. The Bayes factor and the KR statistics are of the order of magnitude similar to those in Table 5 . However, these results should be interpreted cautiously due to the non-linearities induced by the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate in the latest observations.
The importance of the value of the leverage is stressed by several studies, such as Jordà et al.
(2011) among many others. In the SWBGG model a change in the steady state leverage ratio, K N , has a direct impact on equation (16a) in Table 1 . In the SWGK model a change in the steady state leverage ratio, lev, aects the evolution of net worth of FI, equation (20b) in Table 1 . In both models any change in the leverage ratio clearly inuences the nancial accelerator eect as also evident from the counterfactual exercises presented in Figures 7 and 8 .
The leverage ratio is equal to 2 in the SWBGG model and 4 in the SWGK model as shown in the baseline calibration, Table 3 . Table 10 shows how the Bayes factor is aected by changes in the leverage ratio of the two models one at a time.
14 In the SWBGG model the leverage ratio of rms changes from 1.5 to 4.5, implying that from 33% to 78% of rms' capital expenditure are externally nanced. The second column of Table 10 reports the BF between the log data density of the SWGK 14 For each specication the log data density of the SWGK model is computed with the modied harmonic mean estimator. model and the log data density of the SWBGG model for the EA. Similarly, the last column reports this statistics between the log data density of the SWGK model and that of the SWBGG model for the US. The comparison between the SWBGG and SWGK models shows that for both economies the SWGK model is always favored by the data independently of the value of the leverage ratio in the SWBGG model. The second part of the table shows how the Bayes factor varies when the leverage ratio of nancial intermediaries changes from 3 to 5.5 in the SWGK model. There is clear evidence in favor of the SWGK model also in comparison to the SWBGG model. It is also worth noting that when rms and nancial intermediaries have the same leverage ratio 3, 3.5, 4, and 4.5 the SWGK model is always the preferred one.
Both models embed the same types of nominal and real frictions. As a further robustness check, each of the main common frictions is turned o one at a time in the spirit of Smets and Wouters (2007) . This experiment makes also it possible to assess which frictions are important. The rst row of Table 11 reports the log data density of the baseline estimates. No matter which friction is turned o, there is always evidence in favor of the SWGK model compared to the SWBGG model both in the EA and the US. The removal of each friction at a time has a similar eects in the models. On the side of nominal frictions, removing price stickiness implies a considerable deterioration in terms of the log data density. On the side of real frictions, the most important in terms of the log data density is investment adjustment costs. A larger value of the capital utilization elasticity implies higher marginal depreciation cost, and therefore less variation in capital utilization. Removing this friction does not imply a deterioration of the log data density; its value is even higher in all models.
As a robustness exercise, the parameter κ, measuring the elasticity of the external nance premium to the leverage position of rms in the SWBGG model, is calibrated to match steady state values of the nancial variables. In this case the log data density is equal to −357.50398 for the SWBGG model estimated for the EA and to −543.82403 for the SWBGG model estimated for the US. Hence, the SWGK model is still the one favored both by EA and US data. Table 12 shows the log data density of the models estimated allowing for measurement errors for ination and wages, as well as for a moving-average component in the price and wage mark up shocks. The ranking of the models is not aected, being the SWGK model the preferred one. 1.1 × 10 5 2.2 × 10 2 
